

































COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS 
YALE UNIVERSITY 
Box 208281 
New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 
 
 http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/  December 15, 2008   






1.  The urgency of the matter 
  Nicholas Stern (2008) writes, “Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are externalities 
and represent the biggest market failure that the world has seen.”    The simplest proxy 
for the damage caused by GHG emissions is global temperature.    It is not temperature, 
as such, that is the problem: rather, it is the consequences of higher temperature 
concerning water that can be disastrous.  A rise of global temperature by 5
0C. would 
bring about a massive increase in the  intensity of storms and of drought, as well as a rise 
of the sea level by perhaps 10 meters.  It is not unlikely that at least half of earth’s species 
would be wiped out.   
 Global temperature is a function of the stock of carbon equivalent in the 
atmosphere.   Currently, that stock is 430 parts per million CO2 , written “430 ppm 
CO2e.”   If the stock is stabilized at 450 ppm,  then climate scientists estimate that global 
temperature will stabilize at somewhere between 1
0 C. and 3.8
0 C. above the current 
temperature, where this represents a 90% confidence interval.   (That is, with probability 
0.9,  the temperature will stabilize somewhere in the interval [1
0,3.8
0] above where it is 
now.)  If stabilization occurs at 550 ppm, the 0.9 confidence interval for global 
temperature is [1.5
0,5.2
0].   The large lengths of these intervals reflect the uncertainty in 
our knowledge of the effect of carbon emissions on temperature, which is a highly 
complex process, involving feedbacks of various kinds of uncertain magnitudes.  (How 
much do the deep oceans absorb carbon from the air?) The world’s largest computers are 
currently being used to simulate these effects. 
                                                 
* Most of the ideas presented here come from a collaboration with Joaquim Silvestre and 
Humberto Llavador on the problem of intergenerational welfare in a warming planet.  
The paper reports some of the conclusions from our joint work, referenced below.  I 
thank Geir Asheim for comments.   2 
If we continue with ‘business as usual,’ that is, without controlling emissions 
more than we currently do,  we will reach at least 750 ppm CO2e by the end of this 
century.  The 0.9 confidence interval associated with 750 ppm is [2.2
0C,6
0C] warmer 
than today.   Life as we know it would end on the planet. 
Currently climatology says that it is impossible completely to stabilize the level of 
carbon concentration in the atmosphere unless emissions become zero, something which 
is not feasible.  (See Matthews and Caldeira [2008].)  The key question therefore 
becomes how rapidly concentration increases.   If emissions are cut drastically, then the  
stock of atmospheric carbon will increase slowly, and human society will have time to 
adjust.   If we reach an increase in temperature of 5
0C . in 5000 years,  we will have 
plenty of time to move our cities to the polar regions, which by then will be pleasantly 
warm  (snow and glaciers will have disappeared, along with polar bears). 
These facts raise two important ethical issues – of intertemporal and intratemporal 
justice.      Carbon emissions are a public bad: How should rights to produce that bad be 
allocated over the present and future generations of man?    That is the intertemporal 
issue; the intratemporal one is how the rights to emit carbon should be allocated across 
nations today, in the present and next generation.   The proper solution of the second 
problem presupposes the solution to the first.   If we solve the intertemporal problem, 
then we know the emissions ethically permitted for our generation.   We then can ask 
how that permitted amount should be allocated across nations today. 
In this paper, I focus upon the intertemporal ethical issues and their consequences 
for policy.    I will offer in section 8  some comments on the intratemporal question, but a 
fuller study of that question is left for the future.   
 
 
2.  Arguments for discounted utilitarianism 
  The topic of the evaluation of social welfare in an intertemporal context is a well-
worked one in welfare economics; the literature, of a formal sort, begins with Frank 
Ramsey’s (1928) famous paper.  I will summarize Ramsey’s contribution presently as it 
has been applied to the climate-change problem.    3 
  The problem in its general form can be stated as follows.   First, we adopt a model 
where each generation is represented by a single agent: that is, we abstract away from 
distributional issues of humans who live contemporaneously.   One can think of the 
single agent as being the ‘average person.’    
  Let us represent the amenities available to an agent at date t as a vector zt .   
Components of this vector are consumption, leisure, health, education level, biospheric 
quality,  and so on.   Suppose the welfare that the agent enjoys or sustains with this vector 
is u(zt), where u is a ‘utility function’ common to all agents  (i.e., it reflects human 
nature).  An amenity  path is an infinite sequence of these vectors, one for each 
generation: thus, (z1,z2,z3,...).   Such a path may eventually become an unending 
sequence of zero vectors, reflecting the fact that the species has disappeared and 
consumes nothing.    
  Current scientific knowledge can be summarized by saying that we believe that 
there is a certain set of feasible consumption paths, denoted Z.    Any path in Z can be 
implemented, from the technological and physical/biological viewpoint.  Of course, 
different paths implement different trade-offs regarding the consumptions of the prent 
and future generations.    What does  ‘feasible’ mean in this sentence?  Feasibility takes 
account of how much we invest in research and development, and how much technology 
improves as a consequence of that investment.  All aspects of technological change, 
environmental damage, and human knowledge are endogenous, in the sense of being 
generated by investments in research, the environment, and education at earlier dates.   
To specify the set Z we will normally write down a set of dynamic equations which  
relate how all data about the economy at any date t+1 appear as a result of what has 
happened (e.g., investment of various kinds) at previous dates.    Heroically, we will 
assume, here, that all these dynamic relationships are known.  Thus, although we do not 
know what the technology will be in 200 years, we assume that we can estimate how 
much labor productivity will increase if we follow a given path of investment in 
education and in research and development.   These estimates are provided by historical 
data, which enable us to track how labor productivity has increased in the past as a result 
of these investments.   A more complex problem would be posed if we wanted to build in   4 
uncertainty in our knowledge of these relationships, so that the set Z would only be 
specified up to what that uncertainty would imply. 
  Our ethical view is summarized by an intertemporal welfare function, which 
aggregates the welfare levels of the various generations into an index of social welfare
1.  
The arguments of this function,  W,  are the vectors of generational utilities induced by an 
amenity path.   Thus, at  the path z = (z1,z2,z3,....) the social welfare will be 
   W(u(z1),u(z2),u(z3),...). 
It is important to underscore that W embodies our ethical views about how the welfare of 
one generation should be traded off against the welfare of other generations, and the set Z 
embodies facts about the world – that is, facts of nature (biology, physics) and facts about 
human knowledge and learning.    Many discussants in the climate-change debate do not 
respect this division of labor – they want the function W to embody facts about the world, 
not only ethical views.  
The problem of the social planner is to choose that feasible amenity path (in Z) 
which maximizes social welfare: that is to choose z = (z1,z2,...) to 
  maximize  W(u(z1),u(z2),...) subject to z  Z .  
In terms of the just-stated division of labor, the problem is to attain the highest possible 
ethical index subject to the constraints placed upon us by facts about the world. 
  Let us take an example.   Consider the utilitarian social welfare function which is 
given by   




  ,  
whereut is the utility of generation t.   The problem for a utilitarian is to find the amenity 
path that maximizes the sum of utilities over all future dates. 
 If,  indeed,  W should be justified by purely ethical arguments, then we would 
expect that W should be symmetric in its arguments: that is, it should treat all generations 
equally.   Why, indeed, should any generation have a right to more utility than another – 
                                                 
1 More generally, we may order infinite utility streams in a way that cannot be 
represented by a social welfare function.  This issue has been much studied in the recent 
literature, but we ignore it for our purposes here. See, for example, Basu and Mitra 
(2003).   5 
why should we place a higher social value on one generation’s receiving more utility than 
another?     For example, symmetry means that if there were just two generations, then it 
should be the case that the planner is indifferent between giving the first generation 7 and 
the second one 10 units of utility, and the other way around:  that is, for any numbers u 
and v it should be true that 
    W(u,v) = W(v,u). 
Indeed, this is true of the utilitarian social welfare function:  it does not matter in what 
order we list the utility numbers, their sum will be the same. 
  I can now state the social welfare function which is employed by almost all the 





  , where 
  is a number less than one, called the discount factor.  The superscript ‘DU’ stands for 
‘discounted utilitarian.’  Sometimes the discount factor is written as  =
1
1+
, and  is 
called the discount rate. 
  One immediately notes that this social-welfare function is not symmetric: it places 
less value on the utility of generations, the farther distant they are from the present.  What 
could justify such a move?    There are a number of possible justifications for adopting a 
discounted-utilitarian intertemporal ethic.   I will partition them into three categories, 
which I  discuss in turn. 
A.  The present generation as hegemon 
  I present two justifications in this category. 
A.1.   The infinitely lived consumer 
  Suppose we think of the generations of mankind as ethically analogous to 
different periods in the life of a single individual.   Suppose this individual discounts her 
own future utility at a rate  : that is, if the path of her consumption of amenities is given 
by z = (z1,z2,...) then her ‘lifetime’ utility will be u(z1)+ u(z2)+ 
2u(z3)+...  .   The 
number   reflects the individual’s degree of impatience:  if  = 0.9 , this individual 
would trade-off one unit of utility next year for slightly more than 0.9 units of utility 
today.     6 
  If we choose   to reflect an individual’s subjective rate of time preference 
(impatience) in this manner,  and if we use the discounted-utilitarian social welfare 
function,  then the different generations of human society are being treated as if they were 
different periods in the life of this individual.    In particular, if   is ‘small,’ the 
individual is ‘impatient,’ and we will discount the welfare of future generations just as a 
quite impatient individual discounts his own future welfare.   
  A.2.  The altruistic parent 
  Suppose that each adult has one child and cares about the utility of her child.   
Suppose  the utility of the parent, who is an adult at date t, is a function the amenities she 
enjoys and of her child’s utility, and this takes a linear form, where she places a weight of 
 <1 on her child’s utility: 
   U1(z1,U2) = u(z1)+ U2.              (1) 
Here, U1  is the overall utility function of the parent, which is a function of what we 
might call her personal standard of living, which is a function u of the amenities she 
consumes, and of the overall utility of her child.   
But the same equation holds for generation 2: 
  U2(z2,U3) = u(z2)+ U3.       (2) 
Substituting this expression for U2  into (1), we have: 
   U1(z1,U2) = u(z1)+ u(z2)+ 
2U3.     (3) 
Indeed, we can continue to expand the right-hand side of this equation indefinitely, which 
gives the formula: 




  u(zt).    (4) 
The right-hand side  of equation (4) is just the discounted-utilitarian formula.    
  In other words:  If all parents are altruistic, and conceive of their overall welfare 
as their own standard of living plus a number   times their child’s (overall) welfare, then 
maximizing the overall welfare of the first generation implies maximizing the sum of 
discounted standards of living of all generations. 
  The reason I place justifications A.1 and A.2 of discounted utilitarianism in the 
category ‘present generation as hegemon’ is that they both amount to maximizing the   7 
utility of the first generation.    For the utility in (4) is just the utility of the generation –
one parent! 
 
B.  Uncertain existence of future generations 
  Suppose that the social evaluator is uncertain when the human species will 
become extinct.  We make an extremely simple assumption, that there is a probability of 
p that each generation in the future will be the last generation; there is an independent 
draw at each date, which, with probability p, will extinguish mankind.   This probability, 
we furthermore assume, is independent of the amenity path that is chosen (a highly 
unreasonable but simplifying assumption). 
  Suppose the evaluator is a utilitarian: if he knew that the world would last exactly 
T generations, then he would choose a consumption path z




 .    We now assume that this evaluator has von Neumann – Morgenstern 
preferences over lotteries – in this case, the lottery is over the number of dates that the 
species will exist – and that his von Neumann- Morgenstern utility function is given by 
the utilitarian function.   Then he should choose the consumption path to maximize his 
expected utility: that is, the probability-weighted sum of the utilities he receives if the 
world lasts any finite number of dates.   Suppose that the probability that the species lasts 
exactly T dates is (T).   Then the evaluator’s problem is to choose the infinite path 
z = (z1,z2,z3,...) to maximize: 
  (1)u(z1)+(2)(u(z1)+ u(z2))+(3)(u(z1)+ u(z2)+ u(z3))+....       (5) 
It can easily be shown that (T) = (1 p)
T 1p, and so, it follows from a little algebra, 
that maximizing the expression in (5) is equivalent to maximizing: 




  u(xt)   where  =1 p . 
That is, the social evaluator is just a discounted utilitarian, where the discount factor is 
one minus the probability of human extinction at each date.   8 
  Note that in this justification, the discount factor  has nothing to do with a 
subjective rate of time preference or a degree of altruism of an agent: it is a technological 
parameter concerning the universe.  
 
C.  Axiomatic characterizations 
  These justifications are more abstract.  They do not begin with utility functions, or 
social welfare functions, but with general orderings on infinite sequences of 
utilitiesu = (u1,u2,u3,...), to be thought of as describing the utilities experienced by 
different generations in a history of the world. 
  A social welfare function, as defined above, generates an order on such 
sequences, but there may be orders that cannot be represented by a social welfare 
function.   Let us define two axioms on the orderings of these utility streams.   The first is 




converge to a particular infinite utility stream u  (that is, stream u
i  gets very close to the 
stream u as i gets large).  Continuity states that if every u
i  is weakly socially preferred to 
some other infinite utility stream y, then u must also be weakly preferred to y.    
Continuity is an axiom that says the social ordering does not make ‘jumps’.   The second 
axiom is monotonicity.   Suppose we have two infinite utility streams u and   u , and the 
utility of every generation is at least as large in the first stream as in the second stream, 
and some generation has larger utility in the first stream.   The monotonicity axiom states 
that u should be ranked strictly preferable to   u .      This axiom is sometimes called 
strong Pareto optimality.  If no generation is worse off in u than in   u , and some 
generation is better off, then the Ethical Observer should rank the u world as (strictly) 
better than the   u  world. 
  Finally, we define a property called social impatience.   Suppose we have a utility 
stream u = (u1,u2,u3,...,ut,ut+1,....) and then we create another stream by interchanging 
for some t, ut  and u1 : thus,  ˆ u = (ut,u2,u3,...,ut1,u1,ut+1,...), and suppose that ut > u1.  
Social impatience states that the stream  ˆ u must be (strictly) preferred to u.  In other 
words, the social evaluator would prefer to have the larger utility experienced earlier in 
history.    9 
  Diamond (1965) proved that if a complete social ordering of infinite utility 
streams satisfies continuity and monotonicity, then it must satisfy social impatience.   
This means that something like discounting of future utilities must occur if continuity and 
monotonicity are satisfied.   The Diamond theorem, however, does not say that the social 
evaluator maximizes a sum of discounted utilities (that would be a special case of the 
Diamond conclusion). 
  Finally, there is a famous theorem of Koopmans (1960) which provides an 
axiomatization of discounted utilitarianism.  It is beyond my scope here to present this 
result: it says that if a number of axioms are satisfied with respect to the ordering of 
infinite utility streams, then the social ordering can be represented by the discounted sum 
of some increasing function of the utilities, discounted by some positive discount rate.  
But the theorem does not provide any way for adjudicating among these choices.  It 
merely says that the social preference order lies in a certain class of preference orders
2. 
  Let me now evaluate these various justifications of the discounted-utilitarian 
approach.   I find both the justifications of Approach A unconvincing.  The reason is 
simple:  the social evaluator is taking into consideration only the utility of the first 
generation.  This is obviously the case in the model of the infinitely lived consumer – for 
there is only one individual in this model.   In particular, if the infinitely lived consumer 
is very impatient, then the social evaluator discounts heavily the welfare of future 
generations.     A similar criticism applies to the altruistic-parent model.  Suppose that the 
parents across the generations are only mildly altruistic, so that the value of   is small.    
Again, the Ethical Observer must discount heavily the welfares of future generations.    
There is no justification, in my view, of prejudicing the desires of the first generation in 
the way that these two models do.  The subjective views of the first generation, with 
regard either to impatience or altruism, should not determine our intergenerational ethics.   
To give the first generation such power completely violates fairness, which requires that 
we give all generations equal consideration.  Formally, this is summarized by the 
requirement that the social-welfare function be symmetric.   To put it slightly differently, 
                                                 
2 There is by now a large literature which develops the axiomatic approach to social 
preferences on abstract sets of infinite utility streams.  For recent contributions see, for 
example, Asheim and Tungodden (2004), and Roemer and Suzumura (2007).   10 
it is fallacious to assume that either the model of an infinitely-lived consumer, or of the 
altruistic parent is ethically equivalent to a model of many distinct generations. 
  Dasgupta (2005, page xx), an economist active in climate-change analysis,  
believes otherwise.  He writes, with regard to the model of the infinitely lived consumer: 
  An individual’s lifetime well-being is an aggregate of the flow of well-being she  
experiences, while intergenerational well-being is an aggregate of the lifetime 
well-beings of all who appear on the scene.  It is doubtful that the two aggregates 
have the same functional form.  On the other hand, I know of no evidence that 
suggests we would be way off the mark in assuming they do have the same form.  
As a matter of practical ethics, it helps enormously [my italics- JR] to 
approximate by not distinguishing the functional form of someone’s well-being 
through time from that of intergenerational well-being.     
 
This is an amazing statement.  Dasgupta says, first, and correctly in my view, that there is 
no reason to believe that the model of the infinitely-lived consumer is a good model for 
intergenerational ethics, but then says it ‘helps enormously’ to assume that it is a good 
model.   We will argue in this paper that there are very good alternatives to discounted 
utilitarianism, and hence this superbly pragmatic view is unnecessary. 
  Let me turn to Approach C: I will discuss the Diamond result, but the same 
critique applies to the Koopmans theorem.  One problem with requiring certain axioms to 
hold on very complicated mathematical objects (here, sets of infinite utility streams), is 
that the axioms may impose restrictions that are much more severe than our intuitions  
warrant.  For instance, the axiom of continuity is very powerful and abstract.  One must 
be comfortable with the idea of the convergence of a sequence of paths (each of which 
contains an infinite number of elements) to a path.  Do our intuitions really grasp the 
import of requiring this condition on a social preference order?    One of the best ways of 
evaluating theorems such as Diamond’s is to ask what kinds of social orderings (i.e., 
theories of intergenerational distributive justice) it declares inadmissible.    The following 
three social orderings do not satisfy the Diamond axioms: 
•  undiscounted utilitarianism 
•  maximin 
•  leximin.   11 




   with   ut
t=1

 -- is ruled inadmissible because it does not provide a complete ordering 
– and that is the only reason it is disqualified.  It is incomplete, because if the sums of the 
utilities on two paths are both infinite, then utilitarianism cannot compare these two paths 
-- hence incompleteness (on the domain of utility streams posited in Diamond’s theorem).  
But on the set of paths where the sum of utilities does converge, utilitarianism is both 
monotonic and continuous.   So utilitarianism is eliminated only because it is incomplete.  
Is it, however,  incompleteness such a defect of an ethical theory?  Where, indeed, do we 
have an ethical theory that provides convincing answers to all ethical questions?    
  The ‘maximin’ ordering says that a stream u = (u1,u2,...) is preferable to a 
stream   u = (  u1,  u2,...) if and only if the smallest utility in the first stream is greater than 
the smallest utility in the second stream.   This is a very familiar social ethic, from Rawls 
(although he did not apply it in the intergenerational context).  But maximin violates 
monotonicity:  the stream (1,2,2,2,....)   is ranked socially indifferent to the stream 
(1,1,1,....), because in both cases the minimum utility is one,  which contradicts 
monotonicity.    
 Leximin is the social ordering which ranks one stream as better than another if 
and only if the lexicographic minimum of the first is greater than the lexicographic 
minimum of the second: but this ordering is not continuous (see Roemer [1996]).    
  If one believes that these three social orderings have some virtue, then one must 
call into question the usefulness of the Diamond result. 
  It is furthermore the case – and this is of utmost importance in the climate-change 
discussion – that the Diamond (and Koopmans) axiomatic characterizations give no clue 
as to what the size of the discount rate should be.  They both provide axiomatic 
characterizations of classes of social preference orders, where the class in each case 
contains orders represented by social-welfare functions with a many discount rates. 
  In my view, Approach B is the only convincing argument for adopting a 
discounted-utilitarian approach.   I do not say it is a fully convincing argument, because it 
depends upon the premise that the Ethical Observer is a utilitarian, and that is 
contestable, but I find it to be a good argument for discounted utilitarianism, if one’s   12 
underlying ethical view is utilitarianism.    How do I address the fact that the discounted-
utilitarian objective does not, in the final analysis, give equal weights to the welfare of all 
generations?  This comes about because of a naturally asymmetry in facts about the 
world: to wit, that the probability that the world will last for T+n generations is less than 
the probability that it will last for T generations, for any positive n.  (As the physicists 
say, time flows in only one way.)  Thus, although the Ethical Observer begins with a 
symmetric social welfare function, he ends up with an asymmetric one. 
 
3.  What climate-change economists do 
Most economists (e.g., Nordhaus(2008) and many who use cost-benefit analysis, 
although not Stern(2007)) who use a discounted-utilitarian formula in climate-change 
analysis adopt the infinitely-lived consumer approach: this can be seen by noting that 
they justify their choice of discount factor by appealing to the rate of interest
3.   I claim 
this can only be based on the model of society as one of an infinitely lived consumer. 
    I will present a model to explain this important point.   Suppose that an infinitely 
lived individual has a utility function for his consumption over the infinite number of 
periods of his life, which is given by: 




   
 










Here the function u evaluates the consumer’s single-period utility: it is a concave 
function of c for parameter values  > 0, and it is the utility function that is used by 
many climate-change researchers (e.g., Nordhaus).   His discount rate, which reflects his 
degree of impatience, is ;  his discount factor is 
1
1+
.   Diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption is reflected in the assumption that  > 0.     The individual begins life with 
a capital stock of s0 .   At each period, he devotes his entire energies to work; the amount 
of output he produces at date t if his capital stock inherited from the last date is st1 is 
given by  f(st1), where f is an increasing, concave function.   Then his problem of life-
                                                 
3 This locution may seem strange. Aren’t economists up-front about their justification of 
discounted utilitarianism?  No:  they rarely state the fundamental view (e.g., the view A 
or B or C) that would justify the ethic of discounted utilitarianism.   13 
time utility maximization is to choose a consumption path (c1,c2,c3,...) and an investment 
path (i1,i2,i3,...) to  
















                    subject to:  
        
(1) ct + it = f(st1), t =1,2,3,...
(2) st = (1 d)st1 + it, t =1,2,3,...
             Program ILC 
where it  is the amount of output he chooses to invest in the capital stock at date t.   
Constraints (1) simply say that output is partitioned between consumption and investment 
at each date, and constraints (2) say that the capital stock at date t equals the depreciated 
capital stock from the last date plus new investment.   (Capital depreciates at rate d per 
period.) 
  Define the growth rate of consumption at date t along a path, denoted g(t), by the 
formula: 




Define the marginal productivity of capital net of the depreciation rate  at date t, denoted 
r(t), by: 
  r(t) =  f (st1) d ,  
where   f  is the derivative of f.    Then it can be proved that the solution of Program ILC 
entails that: 
   (1+)(1+ g(t))
 = r(t)+1     for all dates t. 
Taking the logarithm of this equation, we have: 
  log(1+)+log(1+ g(t)) = log(1+ r(t)). 
Now suppose that the numbers ,g(t), and r(t) are all close to zero.   Using the fact that 
if x is a small positive number, then log(1+ x)  x , we can write this equation as: 
   +g(t)  r(t); 
finally, we can write this as: 
  r(t)  +g(t).        (Ramsey)   14 
This equation is known as the Ramsey equation, as it was first derived in Ramsey (1928).  
The reason the notation r is chosen for the quantity it represents is that in a market 
economy where firms maximize profits, r(t) can be thought of, in economic equilibrium,  
as the (real) consumption rate of interest.   
  Now what many economists do, in analyzing climate change, is to deduce the 
value of the subjective impatience parameter  from the Ramsey equation.  Assuming 
that we are in a situation where rates of interest and growth rates of consumption are 
relatively stable, we can delete the time arguments in (Ramsey), and write the Ramsey 
equation as: 
      r g.       (Ramsey*) 
The consumption interest rate r, the growth rate g  are all observables from economic 
data.   Economists in the climate-change area (e.g., Nordhaus and Weitzman) typically 
estimate  by appealing to the idea that it reflects attitudes towards risk, and subjective 
views of inequality aversion that people have.  (A larger value of  reflects a higher 
degree of inequality aversion.  See Dasgupta (2008) for a good discussion.)  Hence   is 
estimated,  since all the terms on the right-hand side of (Ramsey*) are observed or 
conjectured (as with ).    It is this value of  that these economists use as the discount 
rate in the social welfare function for intergenerational welfare calculations. 
  In summary, the discount rate that is estimated from equation (Ramsey*) is based 
upon these assumptions : 
  (1) that the economy is a  competitive market economy, and the marginal 
productivity of capital net of the rate of depreciation can be taken to be equal to the 
observed real consumption interest rate; 
  (2) an infinitely lived consumer, who represents Society,  has decided on his 
consumption path by maximizing a utility function in which   is his subjective rate of 
time preference. 
  Nordhaus’s  (2008) approach is somewhat of a mixture: he takes the parameter  
in the utility function u to reflect not the individual’s attitude towards his own 
consumption, but the (subjective) attitudes of people about inequality of consumption 
across generations.  But because Nordhaus (and other authors) take r from market data,   15 
we can only assume that the  they compute from (Ramsey*) is the individual’s rate of 
time preference, because in making their savings decisions, actually market agents are 
optimizing given their own subjective rates of time preference.    
   Moreover, I claim that the model of the infinitely-lived consumer is the only way 
to justify this choice of the discount factor.  This is, of course, a sweeping claim.   Surely, 
it would be a remarkable coincidence if some other (ethically more appealing) way of 
justifying this approach turned out to be equivalent to the model of the infinitely lived 
consumer.   I cannot prove that this claim is true  (who could ever do so?).   Suffice to say 
that the claims that some have made for other justifications of the Ramsey equation are 
bogus  (more on this below).   
  To show the ubiquity of this practice, let me quote Nordhaus (2008, p. 10): 
In general, we can think of the discount rate as the rate of return on capital 
investments.   We can describe this concept by changing our one-
commodity economy from corn to trees.  Trees tomorrow (or, more 
generally, consumption tomorrow) have a different ‘price’ than trees or 
consumption today because through production we can transform trees 
today into trees tomorrow.  For example, if trees grow costlessly at a rate of 
5 percent a year, then from a valuation point of view, 105 trees a year from 
now is the economic equivalent of 100 trees today. … Therefore, to 
compare different policies, we take the consumption flows for each policy 
and apply the appropriate discount rate.  We then sum the discounted 
values for each period to get the total present value.  ….The choice of an 
appropriate discount rate is particularly important for climate-change 
policies because most of the impacts are far in the future.  The approach of 
the DICE model [Nordhaus’s model] is to use the estimated market return 
on capital [ the interest rate] as the discount rate.  The estimated discount 
rate in the model averages 4 percent per year over the next century. 
 
In fact, in Nordhaus (2008, p. 178) chooses: 
  r = .055, g = .02  = 2  = .015 . 
If we substitute these values into the Ramsey equation, we compute that  
   r = g + . 
His value of  =
1
1+
 is 0.985 , and so the utility of individuals one century from 
now is discounted by a factor of (.985)
100 = 0.22;  their welfare counts about one-
fifth as much as ours in his social calculus.    16 
    How does this jibe with his claim quoted above that ‘the estimated 
discount rate in the model averages 4 percent per year’?  This is because there are 
in fact two discount factors in Nordhaus’s locution: the discount factor on utility, 
which is 1/( 1+), and the implied discount factor on consumption, which is a 
consequence of solving the optimization problem (ILC).  At the solution to that 
problem, one can ask, “How much would the consumer require as an increment in 
consumption at date t (call this incrementct ) in order to compensate him for a 
small decrease in consumption (call this decrement ct+1) at date t+1?   It can be 




(See Dasgupta (2008, fn.12) for the derivation.)  So rt  can be viewed as the 
consumption discount factor, as opposed to  , which is the utility discount factor.   
Note, however, that   is a primitive of the model – it comes with the objective 
function – while rt  is endogenous, a number which is deduced as a consequence of 
solving the consumer’s optimization problem.   For conceptual clarity, it is the 
discount rate on utility that is important for the theory. 
  Let me respond in another way to the above citation of Nordhaus, for his 
argument may sound appealing to the reader: Why, indeed, should we not discount 
future welfare by a great deal, if the marginal productivity of capital is so large, so 
that 100 trees today can be transformed into 100 x (1.04)
100  = 5050 trees a century 
from now?   The answer is that this fact of capital’s marginal productivity will be 
properly incorporated into the specification of the set Z of amenity paths – and that 
is the only way it should appear in the problem.    Our social welfare function must 
be founded on ethical judgments only, not on technological facts.    Our problem is 
to maximize a welfare function justified by general ethical principles, which 
properly incorporates the relative worth of all generations, subject to constraints 
which are determined by facts about the world (technological progress, the 
influence of emissions on biospheric quality, etc.).    
The same conceptual error occurs, in a slightly different form, in the next 
citation.  Partha Dasgupta, a more philosophically oriented economist than 
Nordhaus, writes as follows (Dasgupta [2008, p. 145]):   17 
There are two reasons why it may be reasonable [to discount future 
consumption at a positive rate].  First, an additional unit of consumption 
tomorrow would be of less value than an additional unit of consumption 
today if society is impatient to enjoy that additional unit now (my italics – 
JR).  Therefore, impatience is a reason for discounting future costs and 
benefits at a positive rate.  Second, considerations of justice and equality 
demand that consumption should be evenly spread across the generations.  
So, if future generations are likely to be richer than us, there is a case for 
valuing an extra unit of their consumption less than an extra unit of our 
consumption, other things being equal.  Rising consumption provides a 
second justification for discounting future consumption costs and benefits 
at a positive rate. 
 
Dasgupta’s first reason for positive discounting of the consumption of future 
generations, which I have italicized, is clearly based on the model of the infinitely-
lived consumer.  Who is ‘society’ in his phrase?   It is the present generation.  
Surely, if ‘society’ included all future generations, his phrase would be 
nonsensical.  (How could we say that our great-grandchildren are impatient to 
enjoy an extra unit of consumption now?  )  But society, for the Ethical Observer 
must comprise all generations of humans who will ever live.   Dasgupta’s second 
reason for discounting future utility is incoherent, for it puts the cart before the 
horse.  We do not know that future societies will be ‘richer’ than we are: whether 
or not that occurs will be an outcome of the policies we decide to implement – it 
cannot be taken as a premise.  And if those societies are indeed ‘richer,’ because of 
the technological progress that takes place -- which will depend, inter alia, on the 
resources we pass down to the next generation through education --  and because 
we have saved the global commons for them, and it turns out that the optimal 
policy has their consuming more than we do, their average unit of consumption 
will not receive as much weight in the social-welfare function as our average unit 
as long as  > 0, which implements diminishing marginal utility. Why further 
discount their utility with positive discount rates?   This is, again, an issue of 
mixing the ethics (which determine what social welfare function we maximize) 
with the facts about the world (which determine the feasible set of paths over 
which maximization takes place).     18 
  Weitzman (2007) also bases his analysis on the Ramsey equation, and 
proposes the values: 
  r = 0.06 g = 0.02  = 2  = 0.02. 
Thus Weitzman would discount the utility of individuals one century from now by 








= .138;  their utility is worth about one-seventh of ours, in 
his social calculus. 
  The only economist recently active in climate-change research who is a 
discounted utilitarian and uses a discount factor very close to one is Stern (2007), 
who chooses   = 0.001per annum. This gives a discount factor of  = 0.999 per 
year.   Stern would therefore discount the utility of those living a century from now 








= 0.90, that is, by only about 10%.   And Stern (2008) 
writes explicitly that the only justification for discounting utilities of future 
generations is because of the possibility that they might not exist.  So Stern is 
clearly adopting Approach B described here, and assuming that the probability that 
the species becomes extinct is 0.001 in each year. 
  Indeed, Stern (2007) has been criticized by Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman 
(2007) for using a discount factor too close to one.   Although the arguments of these 
critics are stated in terms of opportunity costs, and are not transparent to the non-
economist, they all boil down to a fundamental claim that the right discount factor is 
derived from the observed marginal productivity of capital.   Since the marginal 
productivity of capital in a competitive economy is equal to the interest rate, which is the 
‘opportunity cost’ of using resources today instead of tomorrow, the arguments are stated 
in terms of opportunity cost.  The critics would be more forthright if they simply argued 
that the right model for intergenerational welfare analysis is the one of the infinitely-lived 
consumer, rather our Approach B.   
  Lest readers think that I put too fine a point on the issue of the meaning of the 
discount rate, and therefore on its size, I quote the abstract from Nordhaus (2007): 
How much and how fast should we react to the threat of global warming? The 
Stern Review argues that the damages from climate change are large, and that   19 
nations should undertake sharp and immediate reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions. An examination of the Review's radical revision of the economics of 
climate change finds, however, that it depends decisively on the assumption of a 
near-zero time discount rate [ i.e.,  = .001] combined with a specific utility 
function. The Review's unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme 
immediate action will not survive the substitution of assumptions that are 
consistent with today's marketplace real interest rates and savings rates. 
 
  Although Frank Ramsey (1928) pioneered the analysis of intertemporal social 
welfare,  he wrote in the introduction of that paper: 
 One point should perhaps be emphasized more particularly; it is assumed that we 
do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which 
is ethically indefensible and arises merely from weakness of the imagination; we 
shall, however, in Section II, include a rate of discount in some of our 
investigations. 
 
 Ramsey is perfectly clear, and correct, on the ethics.  So why did he nevertheless 
introduce a rate of discount later in his paper?  Because often it is the case that the 
maximum of the undiscounted utilitarian welfare function is infinite, and this infinite 
value is achieved by many possible consumption paths, so the utilitarian view provides 
no way of choosing an optimal path!    This, indeed, is why many economists today use 
discounted-utilitarianism: not because it has a sound ethical foundation – at least for the 
discount rates commonly employed – but because it gives a unique answer to the 
problem.    There is no good justification for this practice: it is an example of looking for 
the lost diamond ring under the street lamp, because that is the only place one can see! If 
(undiscounted) utilitarianism does not enable us to find the optimal policy in all 
problems, that means only that it is an incomplete ethical doctrine – not something to be 
ashamed of.   Recall how Diamond’s axiomatization eliminated utilitarianism ab initio 
because it is an incomplete ordering.    This does not imply that the way of ‘completing’ 
utilitarianism is to discount future utilities with sufficiently small discount factors so that 
unique optimal paths exist.     An argument with valid ethical foundations must be given 
to justify such a practice.  
  Bad ethics –  adopting the model of the infinitely – lived consumer as ethically 
equivalent to a sequence of generations of human beings—are prevalent among 
economists on this important issue,  and this is reflected in the focus of discussion being 
‘what is the proper discount rate to choose,’ as if this were a subjective issue.   According   20 
to Approach B, there is fact of the matter as to what the discount rate should be, and it 
has nothing to do with (subjective) rates of time preference of individuals, or subjective 
degrees of intergenerational altruism.   
   It must be said that Weitzman (2008), although he adopts the view of the 
infinitely-lived consumer, has another argument for the irrelevance of the discount rate – 
that is, that consequences of not taking serious measures to control emissions today will 
be so disastrous (with large probability), that the precise value of the discount rate is of 
only secondary importance.   In terms of the mathematics, he is saying that with 
insufficient abatement, the utilities of generations not far in the future may be so low that 
even a discounted utilitarian who chooses   to be fairly small would decide upon serious 
abatement.    I agree with Weitzman’s conclusion, but it does not substitute for doing the 
ethics properly. 
  I do not wish to misrepresent Dasgupta’s position.  I have quoted him as 
advocating the model of the infinitely-lived consumer, and deducing the discount factor 
from market data.  But his position is ambivalent.   In Dasgupta (2008, p.157), he also 
writes: 
One influential school of philosophers has argued that societal impatience is 
ethically indefensible.  They say that to set  > 0  is to favour policies that 
discriminate against the well-being of future generations merely on the grounds 
that they are not present today.  They also say that values frequently in use among 
economists, ranging as they do between 2-3% a year, are way too high.  I find 
their arguments hard to rebut. 
Dasgupta does not seem satisfied with any of the resolutions on offer of the problem of 
choosing the ‘right’ values for  and .   I submit that the true problem may be in the 
adherence to the (discounted) utilitarian social welfare function.   Dasgupta (and surely 
Nordhaus and Weitzman as well) do not consider abandoning utilitarianism as the basis 
for intergenerational ethics.    I will argue in the next section that one should consider 
doing so.  
 
4.  Sustainability   21 
  I have argued that, if the Ethical Observer is a utilitarian with von Neumann- 
Morgenstern preferences under uncertainty, then he should choose a discount rate very 
close to zero, to reflect the very small probability that the human species will end at any 
given date.  (Of course, this argument is modulo the simplifying assumption that the 
consumption path chosen will not affect that probability. )   But are there alternatives to 
being a utilitarian?   It is noteworthy, as I have pointed out, that neither side of the 
‘discount rate debate’ that has taken place in the last two years in the economics journals 
challenges utilitarianism as an ethical view. 
  Although Rawls mounted a pervasive critique of utilitarianism, this seems to have 
had little effect on economists, who routinely adopt utilitarian objective functions.  This 
is not the place to review the arguments pro and con.  Let us just note the simple fact that 
utilitarianism treats society as a vessel without boundaries between persons – in the 
precise sense that all that matters is the total stuff (utility) in the vessel, not how it is 
distributed among the individuals who comprise it.  In this sense, it seems quite at odds 
with liberalism, which prizes individual distinctiveness.   Utilitarians attempt to temper 





 which are greater than one, which  builds in an aversion to 
inequality between individuals (here, between generations).  I believe this is an ad hoc 
way of addressing the problem. 
  Indeed, there is an obvious alternative to utilitarianism, which draws upon the 
popular view that we should intergenerational ethics should require sustainability.  How 
can we interpret this view?   I propose that it means that the Ethical Observer should 
choose a consumption path which maximizes the level of human welfare that can be 
sustained forever (or for as long as the human species exists).  Suppose the human 
species were to last forever: then the problem would be to choose z  Z  to maximize the 
number  such that, for every date t, u(zt) .    That is – human welfare is sustained 
at a level of at least  for all time, where the path is chosen so that  is the largest 
number making this statement true. 
  I note that this is distinctly anthropomorphic conception of sustainability: it 
differs from strong sustainability, which maintains that the biological capital of the earth   22 
should be sustained forever.   The anthropomorphic conception is less radical and is often 
called ‘weak sustainability’: it is theoretically possible that humans could deplete the 
earth’s biological capital and maintain their own welfare.   
  In other parlance, this is just the ‘maximin’ social welfare function: that is,  is 
just the welfare of the worst-off generation.    My collaborators and I find this an 
attractive ethic, and we have investigated its consequences for intertemporal distribution 
in  Llavador, Roemer, and Silvestre (2008a), hereafter LRSa.  Sustainability was first 
introduced into the economic literature soon after John Rawls’s book was published: 
early contributions were Arrow (1973), Dasgupta (1974), and Solow (1974).   For more 
recent contributions to the topic, see the footnote 5 below. 
  The simplest ethical justification of sustainability, so defined, is that the date at 
which a person is born should be viewed as arbitrary from the moral viewpoint, and 
therefore no generation should be better off than any other generation, unless such a 
utility difference comes for free, in the sense that it comes without lowering the utility of 
the worst off generation.   This does not necessarily mean that utilities will be equal for 
all generations –- that is, the ‘maximin’ path may Pareto dominate the highest equal-
utility path.   We are familiar with such a possibility from Rawls; however, the reason 
this may occur here is not due to the familiar incentive effects in Rawls.  It is, rather, that 
there may exist intergenerational public goods which would be produced by early 
generations for their own welfare, but which impact positively upon the welfare of future 
generations.  (For instance, our generation invents the steam engine for ourselves, and 
future generations reap the benefits as well – for free.)   So maximin may well dominate 
equality in the intergenerational context, when innovation is taken into account
4.  For an 
extended discussion of this point, see Silvestre (2002), which characterizes exactly when 
the maximin solution engenders an increase in welfares over generations. 
  The social welfare function which models sustainability is 
  W
S(u(z1),u(z2),u(z3),...) = min
t u(zt).     (6) 
                                                 
4 Suppose we applied the reasoning of Dasgupta(2007).   Suppose that the solution of the 
intergenerational maximin program produces increasing utilities as time progresses. 
Should we then go back and alter our maximin objective to penalize later generations 
because they did well in the first formulation?  Hardly.     23 
Solving the problem  
   maxW
S(u(z1),...) subject to z  Z     (7) 
is the same as finding the maximum  and z such that u(zt)  for all t. 
 In  LRSa
5, we present a model calibrated to our world with climate change  (this 
amounts to being very precise about the nature of the set Z, deriving it from physical 
constraints concerning production, education, the impact of emissions on biospheric 
quality, etc.)  and we solve problem (7) – that is, we find the path that would sustain 
welfare at the highest possible level, given current knowledge about the relationship 
between production, emissions, and global warming.    It turns out that the utilities of all 
generations are equal along that path– that is, maximin and equality indeed recommend 
the same path in this case.  
   Some may be disturbed by this outcome, and thereby reject sustainability as an 
ethic, because it appears to relegate us to a world with no growth (of human welfare)
6.  
Would it not be desirable to have some growth in human welfare – and if so, to use a 
different social-welfare function?   Let us recognize what the trade-offs are.  If we wish 
to have positive growth in human welfare, that means that the early generations will have 
lower welfare than have in the sustainable solution – growth is purchased at this cost.  
But why should early generations sacrifice for later ones?  There is no obvious answer. 
  There is a second defense of the sustainability model.    In the intertemporal 
problem, we have ignored intratemporal inequality.   A strong argument for growth is 
that it usually improves the standard of living of the very poor, which has high ethical 
value.  If there is no intratemporal inequality, this justification disappears.   Thus, 
properly (and consistently) to consider the plight of the very poor requires another model, 
                                                 
5 Geir Asheim, and scholars with whom he has collaborated, has written extensively on 
sustainability in abstract models: see, for example,  Withagen and Asheim (1998),  
Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden (2001), and Buchholz (1998).  I believe, however, that 
LRSa is the first attempt to compute sustainable optimal paths in a concrete model, 
parameterized with real data.  
6 Indeed, the path that solves the optimization problem (7) is the best feasible path 
according to both the maximin and the leximin criterion.  Thus, one can choose which 
ethic one prefers to justify it.  (Following the discussion of Approach C, one can thereby 
choose either to justify it by an ethic that violates continuity, or one that violates 
monotonicity.)   24 
where there is heterogeneity of individuals at each generation – the simplest model would 
have one poor individual and one rich individual at each date.  In that model, we could 
advocate  a preference for paths that bring the welfare of the present-day poor up to the 
welfare of the present-day rich, over a period of time, and then sustain that welfare level 
forever.     For further discussion, see section 8.  
  Nevertheless, Llavador,  Silvestre, and I  believe that the issue of sustainability 
versus growth (of human welfare) cannot be settled completely at the abstract level: it 
requires discovering what the actual trade-offs are – that is, how much the early 
generation(s) would have to sacrifice to permit positive rates of growth of human welfare.    
We investigate in LRSa, besides the sustainable solution, a model which allows for 
human development: that is, growth of welfare over time.      In this case, the problem 
becomes: 
  choose  z  Z to maximize  subject to u(zt)  (1+ g)
t1.     (8) 
Here, we specify exogenously a rate of growth g, and require human welfare to grow at a 
rate of at least g at every date.      If g = 0,  (8) reduces to the sustainability problem.  A 
possible justification for choosing g greater than zero is that humans want their children 
to be better off than they are; indeed, they are willing to sacrifice their own welfare to 
make this possible – or , to state this less personally (so that childless adults are included) 
each generation wants human development to take place, in the sense of increasing 
generational welfare.   Program (8) will have a solution for an interval of positive values 
of g.   
  It is important to note that in program (8), we specify exogenously the rate of 
growth g.  Solving (8) is not equivalent to solving the discounted-utilitarian problem.  We 
do not have an ethical theory directing us how to choose g.  We will present some of our 
results of these two formulations of the intergenerational social-welfare problem below in 
section 6. We will argue that small positive values of g deliver solutions that may appear 
to be ethically preferable to the solution with g = 0 (pure sustainability), because the cost 
borne by the first generation to sustain a small positive g seems acceptable. 
 
5.  The consumptionist fallacy   25 
  In the global-warming literature, economists usually specify the vector of 
amenities as comprising only one component: consumption of a single commodity.  For 




 where  is a positive number, and c is 
the consumption of the representative individual of a produced commodity.  Thus, human 
welfare depends only upon commodity consumption, the commodity being produced 
from capital and labor, and welfare exhibits diminishing marginal utility in consumption.    
  There is an argument of mathematical simplicity that favors choosing only one 
amenity, but LRSa argues that it constitutes a ‘consumptionist fallacy’ to conceptualize 
human welfare as depending only upon consumption of produced goods.   LRSa postulate 
a vector of amenities that comprises four elements:  consumption, educated leisure, the 
stock of human knowledge, and the quality of the biosphere.    Thus, there are four 
avenues that can be traveled to increase welfare:  increasing consumption, increasing 
education, and so on.    As well as being, we feel, more psychologically realistic, this 
allows for the possibility that we maintain (or increase) human welfare by shifting from 
emissions-producing commodities to other activities (like production of knowledge and 
education) which are less emission intensive, but also affect welfare positively.  
  Nordhaus (2008) states that taking utility to depend only on one consumption 
good is a permissible abstraction, and that his reader may think of consumption as 
comprised of various goods.  But this is not right.  The essential point is that consuming 
the four goods in the Quality of Life function of LRSa involve quite different impacts on 
the biosphere.  We may be able to sustain human welfare by, for example, substituting 
education (a low-emissions activity) for automobiles (a high emissions activity).  The 
consumptionist fallacy is committed when the model does not represent consumption 
alternatives for people as implying different effects on scarce biospheric resources. 
  Consumption and leisure are private goods, while the stock of human knowledge 
and biospheric quality are public goods.  We defend modifying leisure by the individual’s 
level of education by saying that education enables more uses for one’s leisure time – 
hence it increases welfare.  It is perhaps contestable to include the stock of human 
knowledge as a factor in individual welfare: we argue that our lives are better, to the 
extent that our science and art and more developed – not because science improves the   26 
quality of commodities we consume  (that will be reflected in consumption) -- but for 
perfectionist reasons.   Knowing how the world works is an intrinsic good in human 
experience – how else to explain our quest for abstract knowledge, which has no 
immediate application?  Finally, including biospheric quality in the welfare of individuals 
models the value that species variety and other biological and environmental goods have 
for humans, intrinsically, quite apart from the medicines that they may generate (although 
health is also related to biospheric quality).   
  On this last point, the philosophical reader may be puzzled: if economists who 
study global warming place only commodity consumption in the basket of amenities, and 
not biospheric quality, how do they model the bad effects of GHG emissions?  The 
answer is that these emissions are assumed to increase the costs (capital and labor) of 
producing commodities – so they impact negatively on consumption.   The only way in 
which a thing can be bad, if the only amenity is commodity consumption, is if it reduces 
the possibilities of consuming! 
  In sum, the larger the number of amenities postulated, the more strategies there 
are for maintaining human welfare besides maintaining commodity consumption.   The 
consumptionist fallacy would seem to force too dismal a set of choices for human society 
– not to speak the truncated conception of human well-being that it models. 
  
6.   Sustainability: Some results 
  Here, I summarize some of the results of analyzing the sustainability model of 
LRSa.   What we call the Quality of Life (QuoL) of a given generation (that is, its 
‘utility’) is a function of commodity consumption, leisure time multiplied by the level of 
the individual’s education, the stock of knowledge, and the quality of the biosphere 
(taken to be inversely related to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere).    The labor of the 
single individual at each generation is divided into four uses: educating the next 
generation, participation in commodity production, working in the ‘knowledge industry’  
(research and development, the arts, university research),  and enjoying leisure time.   
The model begins at year 2000, with four initial stocks:  the average level of education of 
the consumer-producer, the stock of physical capital, the stock of knowledge, and the 
quality of the biosphere.    There are four production functions:  the production of   27 
educated children from adult teaching, the production of commodities from educated 
labor and capital, the production of knowledge from educated labor and capital, and the 
production of biosphere quality from the current stock of biospheric quality and 
emissions.   Emissions are the consequence of commodity production, but the 
relationship between output and emissions changes as a consequence of technological 
progress, whose rate is a function of the stock of knowledge.    The commodity produced 
is used for human consumption and investment (increasing the capital stock).  In turn, 
capital depreciates, as does knowledge (the knowledge of how to make mechanical 
watches is of little value today).   The stocks and flows are illustrated in Figure 1. 
  There are many parameters in the model: parameters which specify the four 
production functions, those which specify the relationship between production and 
emissions, those which model the rate of technical change, those which describe the way 
the amenities combine into an index of quality-of-life, and the two rates of depreciation.  
These parameters are estimated from data using familiar econometric techniques.  
Unfortunately, we had to use, for the most part, US data, and so we cannot argue that our 
results are realistic for the world.     When all parameters have been chosen, and when the 
initial vector of four stocks is specified, we can define the set Z of feasible paths of 
amenity vectors over time as paths of variables that solve a set of dynamic equations. 
  The greatest uncertainty is associated with the production function of biospheric 
quality, for this entails understanding two relationships – that of commodity production 
and consequent emissions to the concentration of atmospheric carbon, and the 
relationship of that stock to global temperature.    As I said, the science on these 
questions is in flux.  LRSa simplifies the problem by taking, as the measure of biospheric 
quality, the amount of ‘clean biosphere,’ the difference between a catastrophically high 
level of carbon particulate concentration and the present level.  This resource of clean 
biosphere is then related to global temperature, which is related to human welfare, using 
current best estimates.    We then compute the optimal sustainable paths that can be 
achieved under various constraints on emissions – that they be such as to (approximately) 
stabilize concentrations at 360 ppm in two generations, or in another variant, at 400 ppm 
in two generations, and so on.    It is assumed in these calculations that population size is 
constant.      28 
  In Table 1, taken from LRSa, the scenario is that carbon concentration stabilizes 
at 363 ppm in two generations (fifty years).  We constrained our production paths to 
produce emissions which are consonant with approximate stabilization at this level of 
concentration according to the estimates of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s Fourth Assessment Report, (IPCC[2008, Chapter 10]).    An approximation to 
the optimal sustainable path is given in the table.  Consumption stabilizes in four 
generations at 31.759, approximately 33% above year 2000 levels
7.   This is 100 years 
from now, and therefore entails a growth of consumption of 0.29% per annum during this 
century – a very low growth rate.  In 100 years, the capital stock stabilizes at 201% of its 
year-2000 level, which represents an annual rate of growth of 0.7%.    The stock of 
knowledge stabilizes at 278% of its year-2000 level, which represents an annual growth 
rate of 1.02 %.  The level of education of the generation 100 years hence would be 130% 
of the year-2000 level, which represents an annual growth rate of 0.26%.   It is interesting 
to note that consumption and education increase at approximately the same small rate for 
one century, and then remain constant thereafter.  The capital stock and knowledge 
increase much more rapidly to their stable levels.     We note as well that leisure time 
does not increase – in fact, it decreases a small amount.  In 2000, two-thirds (0.6667) of 
time was spent in leisure, while in 100 years, it be fall to 0.6588 in the approximately 
optimal scenario.   Indeed, a significantly smaller fraction of labor would be teaching the 
next generation, and a significantly larger fraction would be working in the knowledge 
industry (research and the arts).  Note that the educational level of children would be 
higher, because it is a function of the skill-hours employed in teaching, not just ‘hours,’ 
and the educational level of teachers increases. 
   [place  table  1  here] 
  We next present results for a scenario which has the same emission constraints as 
the previous one, but implements a 1% per annum (28% per generation) increase in the 
Quality of Life forever.  (This corresponds to choosing g = 0.28 in equation (8).)  Of 
course, some generation(s) must sacrifice to permit this growth, and we will see it is 
                                                 
7 In the truly optimal solution, the Quality of Life would be constant across generations.  
We are unable to compute this solution precisely; the approximation presented in Table 1 
converges to constant levels of Life Quality after several generations.   29 
(only) the first generation.   The results are presented in Table 2.   Indeed, this growth 
rate is feasible, while achieving carbon stabilization at 363 ppm in two generations.   The 
trade-off is seen by looking at the quality-of-life of generation 1.    In Table 1, this 
welfare level was 1.3110, and in table 2 it is 1.2999 – a bit less than 1% lower.   This 
sacrifice by Generation 1, however, entails what appears to be significant growth in life-
quality for all generations after that: indeed, in a century, life-quality is 274% higher than 
in year 2000.  Educational levels are 279% higher than year 2000 levels.   The sacrifice 
of the first generation might well be appealing, in the light of future welfare gains that it 
triggers.  From an ethical viewpoint, it is therefore not obvious that sustainability 
dominates a path that allows for some human development. 
      [place table 2 here]  
  The reader is referred to LRSa for more scenarios.    We did not compute the 
optimal discounted-utilitarian paths for the model in LRSa.   Nordhaus (2008) computes 
those paths, but his sets of feasible paths are so different in their details from ours that a 
comparison of the results would not be terribly meaningful.   We presume that if we 
maximized a discounted-utilitarian objective with Nordhaus’s value of  = 0.985 per 
generation, the recommended paths would be quite different.  
 
7.  Uncertainty 
Now suppose we impose uncertainty of the kind discussed in Approach B of 
section 2 on this problem: there is an exogenously given probability p that, at each date, 
the human species will become extinct.   The Ethical Observer is now a sustainabilitarian, 
with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function derived from W
S.   That is, the von 
Neumann Morgenstern utility that the Ethical Observer enjoys if she has chosen the 
infinite amenity path z and the world, in the event, lasts for exactly T dates, is 
  min[u(z1),u(z2),....,u(zT )]. 
 Then she should choose the consumption path z that maximizes her expected utility, 
which is now: 
  (1)u(z1)+(2)min[u(z1),u(z2)]+(3)min[u(z1),u(z2),u(z3)]+...       





    where  =1 p .               (9) 
Thus, the ‘discounted sustainabilitarian’ uses the same discount rate as the discounted 
utilitarian of Approach B, but with a different von Neumann-Moregenstern utilitiy 
function.  At every date, she is concerned with the minimum utility of all those who have 
thus far lived, rather than with the sum of those utilities. 
  There is no explicit treatment of uncertainty in either Nordhaus (2008) or LRSa.  
In this section, we present some results comparing discounted utilitarianism (DU) to 
sustainabilitarianism (Sus) in the presence of the kind of certainty discussed in section 2, 
what we called the uncertain existence of future generations. 
  Ideally, we would like to analyze the optimal discounted-utilitarian and 
sustainabilitarian paths for the model of LRSa, described in section 4.   That model, 
however, is complex, and characterizing the optimal paths for general vectors of 
parameters is very difficult.   In Llavador, Roemer, and Silvestre (2008b), hereafter 
LRSb, we study these solutions for a much simpler model, which, we hope, will suggest 
what we can expect for a more complex and realistic model. 
  The model of LRSb has only two sectors:  commodity production and education.   
The initial social endowment has two elements: the stock of capital, and the stock of 
educated labor at the beginning date.   Capital and labor produce a commodity, which is 
used for investment and consumption.   Labor is partitioned into teaching, commodity 
production, and leisure.   Utility, or the Quality of Life, is a function of consumption and 
educated leisure.    There is no issue of biospheric quality, and no knowledge sector. 
 Define: 
ct  as consumption of generation t 
xt
e  as the amount of educated labor allocated to teaching at generation t 
xt
c   as the amount of educated labor in commodity production at generation t 
xt




l as the total value of skilled labor at generation t 
it   as investment at generation t 
st
k  as the capital stock at date t   31 
  d  rate of depreciation of capital per generation. 
The production function which describes the amount of the produced commodity 
forthcoming from a vector of capital and skilled labor is  f(s
k,x
c).   A feasible path  for 
the economy  consists of a sequence of choices concerning the labor allocation among 
teaching the next generation, production of the commodity, and leisure, and the allocation 
of the produced commodity between consumption and investment,  which can be 
achieved, beginning with the initial social endowment of capital and labor in the 
education sector, (s0
k,x0





satisfying the following equations: 
  
st
k = (1 d)st1
k + it  for t =1,2,...                    (P1)
ct + it = f(st
k,xt
c)    for t =1,2,...                     (P2)
kxt1
e = xt  xt
c + xt
e + xt
l   for t =1,2,...            (P3)
    
  Equations (P1) state that the capital stock at date t equals the depreciated capital 
stock from date t 1 plus new investment; equations (P2) state that the commodity, 
produced from capital and labor, is partitioned at every date between consumption and 
investment; equations (P3) state that the amount of skill units of labor at date t is 
proportional to the skill units of labor allocated to teaching at date t 1.     The set of all 
feasible paths emanating from the endowment (s0
k,x0
e) will be called  ˆ Z(s0
k,x0
e).     A path 
of feasible amenity vectors is a path of consumption – leisure pairs, that is of vectors 
(ct,xt
l), that is part of some feasible path. We write such a path as  
z = ((c1,x1
l),(c2,x2
l ),...) .    What humans care about is consumption and educated leisure, 
and the other variables in a feasible path are subordinate to producing an amenity path.    
The Quality of Life (or utility) function for every generation is u(c,x
l), which we take to 
be a Cobb-Douglas function of these two arguments. 
  We now state three problems of interest.   The first is the problem of the 
sustainabilitarian ethical observer, in an environment with no uncertainty about the 
existence of future generations.    This problem is to find the feasible path that maximizes 
the Quality of Life that can be sustained forever, from an initial endowment vector 
(s0
k,x0
e).    It is written:   32 
   
max  subject to
u(ct,xt
l)                                     (P0)
st
k = (1 d)st1
k + it   , t 1              (P1)
ct + it = f(st
k,xt
c)     , t 1                (P2)
kxt1
e = xt  xt
c + xt
e + xt
l , t 1          (P3)
          (program SUS) 
The next two programs are relevant in a world where the existence of future generations 







 u(xt) subject to
st
k = (1 d)st1
k + it   , t 1              (P1)
ct + it = f(st
k,xt
c)     , t 1                (P2)
kxt1
e = xt  xt
c + xt
e + xt
l , t 1          (P3)
where  =1 p.
          (program DU) 
This is the discounted utilitarian program.   The next program is the one of the 









k = (1 d)st1
k + it   , t 1              (P1)
ct + it = f(st
k,xt
c)     , t 1                (P2)
kxt1
e = xt  xt
c + xt
e + xt
l , t 1          (P3)
where  =1 p.
               (program E) 
  The two key parameters that appear in the analysis of these programs are k and  .   
As we have discussed, and following Stern, an appropriate value for   is gotten by using 
the discount rate of 0.001 per annum and compounding this to give a generational 








= 0.975.      An appropriate value for k is 20; about 5% 
of the labor force is involved in teaching the next generation, and so we may say that one 
unit of skilled teaching labor produces twenty units of skill in the next generation (this 
assumes that skill is not increasing with time).    33 
  These programs are simpler to analyze than the fully articulated program with 
emissions and global warming, described in section 4,   but we hope,  by studying them, 
to gain some intuition for what may be the case with the three analogues of these 
programs, when the set of feasible paths involves the full complexity of emissions, the 
quality of the biosphere, and the production of knowledge.   
   I now summarize some of the results of LRSb, which studies programs SUS, DU, 
and E.   The first question to answer is: When does the DU program diverge?  A program 
diverges if there are feasible paths where the objective function has an infinite value.  If 
this is the case, there are usually many feasible paths for which the infinite value occurs, 
and we then must adopt some other method for assessing the relative desirability of these 
various paths.  Clearly the most desirable path must be one of these (since any one 
dominates any path giving a finite value to the objective), but how do we choose among 
them?  More on this below. 
     We have: 
 
Result 1.   The DU program diverges if and only if k >1. 
If we choose parameters  = 0.975 and k  20, which I have argued may be reasonable,   
then the DU program would surely diverge. 
  The second result is quite remarkable; it states 
 
Result 2  If the DU program diverges, then the feasible path that solves SUS is also the 
feasible path that solves E. 
 
  In particular, although the DU program may diverge, the SUS program never 
diverges: regardless of the value of the parameters (,k) there is a well-defined solution 
of SUS.    Result 2 states that if k >1 then the sustainabilitarian ethical observer, who 
accepts the uncertainty of the existence of future generations, can nevertheless ignore this 
uncertainty, in the sense that the solution to the program E with which she is concerned is 
exactly the same as the solution the program SUS, which ignores the uncertainty!   34 
  What is the intuition behind this result?   If the DU program diverges – that is, if 
k >1 -- it is, intuitively, because the educational technology is highly productive, that 
is, because k is ‘large.’  Now when the sustainabilitarian takes account of uncertainty, she 
wants, at first blush, possibly to reduce the amount of resources allocated to generations 
very far in the future, because there is a substantial probability that these generations will 
not exist (and so it would be a waste, perhaps, to provide for them).    But if the 
educational technology is sufficiently productive, she need not economize in this way.   
Put another way, the only time she would rationally reduce resources allocated to 
generations far in the future is if the educational technology where not very productive.   
If you will, a large value of k trumps the uncertainty involved in the possible non-
existence of future generations: a large k makes society so ‘wealthy’ that it can afford to 
ignore the possible waste of resources on future generations who turn out not to exist.  
  We finally confront the issue of what the utilitarian Ethical Observer should 
recommend in the case that the DU program diverges.   We must adopt some rule for 
comparing feasible paths which give an infinite value to the DU program – for surely, as 
we said,  it is among these paths that the EO must choose.    Economists have proposed 
choosing among these paths by employing an overtaking criterion.   There are a number 
of overtaking criteria proposed in the literature.   The most recent such proposal is by 
Basu and Mitra (2007),   who propose that a feasible path of amenity vectors, which we 
will denote {z(t)|t =1,2,...} is at least as desirable as a feasible path of amenity vectors 
{ˆ z(t)|t =1,2,...} if and only if:   
 
(T)( 








(t > T  u(z(t))  u(ˆ z(t)))
. 
 
In English, this says that the sum of discounted utilities up to some date T on the first 
path is at least as large as that sum for the second path, and for dates later than T, the 
utility of every generation on the first path is at least as large as the utility on the second 
path.   35 
  The Basu-Mitra criterion induces a partial ordering of paths for which DU 
diverges, not a complete ordering.  Nevertheless, it is an appealing proposal.  What are its 
consequences for our problem?    One can show: 
 
Result 3.  If {z(t)} is a path upon which the quality of life eventually grows at a rate g, 
and if {ˆ z(t)} is a path at which the quality of life eventually grows at rate  ˆ g, and g > ˆ g, 
then the path {z(t)} is more desirable than the path {ˆ z(t)} according to the Basu-Mitra 
overtaking criterion. 
 
  Now if path {z(t)} eventually grows faster than path {ˆ z(t)}, that must be because 
resources have been transferred away from early generations towards future generations 
in the path {z(t)} compared to the path{ˆ z(t)} – that is the early generations consume 
less and work harder to accumulate capital that benefits the future generations.   In other 
words, if the DU program diverges, then the utilitarian ethical observer recommends 
paths that reduce the quality of life to the lowest possible levels for early generations, 
entailing the highest possible rate of growth of quality-of-life for later generations.  
(Indeed, there is no ‘best’ path according to the Basu-Mitra criterion, but we can say that 
some paths are more desirable than others, and ones which are high on desirability almost 
starve the early generations.)   In contrast, what does the sustainabilitarian do when DU 
diverges?  She recommends the path that equalizes the quality-of-life for all future 
generations (even if, ex post,  at some point, they will turn out not to exist) at the highest 
possible such level. 
  Now let us return to the problem of global warming, which interests us.  By 
analogy, we conjecture that the DU program where global warming is taken into account 
will diverge.  That is, we conjecture that, even if we constrain emissions not to be so 
great as to engender unacceptably high global temperatures, the process of technological 
innovation and the productivity of the education technology will allow us to construct 
feasible paths upon which the discounted sum of qualities of life will be infinite – and 
this claim depends, as well, on our view that the value of   should be very close to one.  
This would mean that the discounted-utilitarian, if she invokes a Basu-Mitra overtaking   36 
criterion to compare feasible paths, must recommend starving early generations in favor 
of generating high rates of growth of the quality-of-life for the distant future.   In contrast, 
the sustainabilitiarian , by Result 2, even acknowledging uncertainty, will recommend the 
path which equalizes the quality-of-life for all generations at the highest possible level, 
even though, at some date, those generations will, with probability approaching one,  not 
exist.    
 
8.   Intra-temporal resource allocation 
   Suppose that we have solved the intertemporal problem and therefore know what 
total emissions should be for the present generation and the next one, the next fifty years.   
We know as well what total production of commodities should be and what total 
consumption should be for these generations. How should that production be allocated to 
the various regions/countries of the world, and how should consumption be allocated to 
those regions/countries?    
  This is a huge topic, and our team (LRS) plans to study it in the future.  In order 
to influence global negotiations over the rights to emit GHGs, it is tempting to take into 
account, at least to some extent, political reality.  For instance, the naïve cosmopolitan 
approach, of advocating an equal per capita distribution of global consumption, while 
perhaps ethically attractive, is probably not be politically realistic.   
  Table 3 presents the per capita emissions of tons of CO2 and the fraction of total 
emissions coming various areas of the world in 2008: 
 
Country  Per capita emissions (tons)   Percent world total 
United States   19.4  21.4% 
EU15    8.6  12.0% 
China    5.1  24.3% 
India    1.8    7.5% 
Russia    11.8     6.1% 
Japan     9.8     4.5% 
Brazil     2.0     1.4% 
 
Table 3: Global per capita emissions of carbon dioxide in 2008 
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To approximately stabilize the CO2e concentration at 500 ppm by 2050, taking into 
account a projected global population of nine billion people, would require reducing 
emissions to 2 tons per capita.   Among the developed countries, clearly the EU15 and 
Japan are in a better position than the US and Russia to reach this target.   It is reasonable 
to suppose that the solution of the intertemporal problem will require the next two 
generations not to exceed the level of 500 ppm, and hence to emit no more than two tons 
per person CO2e by 2050.  Indeed, many climate scientists believe that 500 ppm CO2e is 
far too high. 
  Here we indicate the kind of considerations concerning intratemporal distribution 
that come into play with a simple model.  Suppose a ‘reasonable’ target is that per capita 
consumption be the same in China/India in 2050 as in the US/EU15.   If this is not 
politically reasonable, at least it may be ethically reasonable.   (Of course, what becomes 
politically reasonably depends upon how well the global population understands the 
ethics.)   Suppose that the manufacturing production in both the South and the North is 
governed by a production function F(K,L,E) where K is capital stock, L is the size of 
the labor force, and E is the amount of emissions.  F is increasing in all three arguments – 
in particular, the more emissions permitted, the greater will output be for a given capital-
labor endowment, because constraining emissions requires spending resources (capital 
and labor) to reduce them.  What differentiates the South and the North is the capital 
labor ratio K / L, which is greater in the North than in the South. 
  I will discuss two possible cases.   The first is that there is no North-South transfer 
of consumption – that is, no subsidy to the South by the North
8.   In this case, the problem 
is to compute the emission levels of the South and the North (ES and EN) which will 
engender equal per-capita consumption at the highest possible level, subject to not 
exceeding the ‘total-emissions budget’ of E , allocated to the generation in question by 
the solution of the intergenerational welfare maxmization problem.    Assume that the 
capital stocks and labor forces in the South and North are given by 
                                                 
8 By a transfer of output, I do not mean international trade, which is a quid pro quo.  I 
mean a gift or subsidy: that one area transfers output to another without a reverse transfer.  
In this simple model with only one produced commodity, there is no scope for trade, 
which can only occur if different regions produce different commodities.   38 
(KN,LN) and (KS,LS) .  We simplify by assuming capital does not depreciate, and the 
entire output is used for consumption.   We may write the program as follows:  
  choose  ES,EN, and y  to maximize y  subject to: 
   
F(KN,LN,EN)/LN = y
F(KS,LS,ES)/LS = y
EN + ES = E
   Program  SN1 
 
Here y is the (equal) per capita consumption (that is, output divided by labor force) of the 
South and the North.   The first two constraints state that each area of the world consumes 
its own output – that is, no transfers occur – and that consumption per capita is the same 
in both.  It is easy to see that, if F exhibits constant-returns to scale, then the solution to 
Program SN1  entails: 







that is, the South should pollute more tons per capita than the North. 
  Now consider a second case, where transfers of output may occur.   Then the 
problem is to allocate emissions to the South and North so as to maximize total 
production subject to the emission budget, and then divide the output in an equal-per 
capita fashion.  Now the problem is: 
 choose  EN,ES, and y  to maximize F(KN,LN,EN)+ F(KS,LS,ES) 
    s u b j e c t   t o   EN + ES = E .                       Program SN2 
The qualitative nature of the solution to this problem cannot be stated without further 
knowledge of the function F.   In particular, if capital and emissions are substitutes in 
production (which is a condition on a second partial derivative of F) then the solution of 
SN2 requires more emissions per capita in the South; however, if they are complements in 
production, it requires more emissions per capita in the North
9. 
  The important conceptual point here is that our ethical views may be linked to a 
conception of equal rights to welfare or to quality of life, which in the very simple model 
just discussed is taken to mean equal consumption of the emissions-producing 
                                                 
9 This analysis is due to J. Silvestre.   39 
manufactured commodity.    China’s claim, that it should be allowed to pollute more per 
capita than the North, may be ethically justified: the details depend upon the nature of the 
manufacturing technology and on the assumptions we make about the degree of inter-
regional transfers. 
  Finally, we present a model which is more politically realistic, in that it does not 
aim at equalizing consumption per capita in the South and the North, and it introduces a 
market for pollution permits.   (In the two models above, markets were not introduced: 
these were purely physical models about desirable outcomes, whose results do not 
depend upon any institutional setting – markets, central plans, or whatever.)    We 
continue to suppose that the target of international negotiations is to achieve a total 
amount of pollution of E  in tons of CO2e.    We assume (that is: we propose)  that 
international negotiations should focus upon one parameter, the relative per capita 
consumption of the South to the North, a fraction a.   For instance, this parameter might 
be reasonably arrived at by computing what the per capita consumptions of the two 
regions would be in 2050 if there were no constraint with respect to carbon emissions.   
The parties agree that the ratio of these two numbers should be the target for the relative 
per capita consumptions of the two regions, when emissions are constrained.    Suppose 
this ratio is a.   The problem is to allocate pollution permits to the two regions – which 
can either be used by the home region or sold to the other region—in order that, at the 
market equilibrium, the ratio of per capita consumptions will be a.   This is a problem 
where there is one degree of freedom – the choice of the volume of pollution permits to 
be allocated to the South  (which then determines what must be allocated to the North).  
There is one target, the ratio a.  So for a set of possible values for a, it will be possible to 
solve the problem.  One number that will appear as part of the market equilibrium is a 
price,  , at which pollution permits trade between the two regions: this price will equate 
the supply and demand for permits in the two regions. 
  The details of this computation need not detain us here.  The important points are 
these: 
•  the focus of international negotiations should be on the parameter a;  the eventual 
decision on the pollution permits given to the two regions will follow from the 
choice of this ethical/political parameter;   40 
•  if the North transfers output to the South,  the mechanism will be through the 
North’s purchasing pollution permits from the South.  Pollution permits will be 
purchased by transfers of the commodity in the reverse direction, where the rate 
of exchange between permits and commodity is .    
 
In particular, it follows from the first bullet that there can be no a priori supposition that 
the formula “allocate pollution permits so that each region has the same rights to pollute 
tons of CO2 e per capita” is correct.  The fundamental ethical and political considerations 
are not based upon a ‘resource-egalitarian’ approach to property rights in pollution 
permits, but rather on a target for relative consumptions (or welfares) of the different 
regions of the world.  
  The discussion among economists, and between economists and the public, is 
often phrased in terms of finding the right ‘social cost’ of carbon emissions.  This is 
somewhat confusing.  The correct social cost of carbon emissions is the equilibrium price 
  determined by the model just discussed:  and in general it will depend upon the 
political agreement on a  that is reached in the international negotiations.  Thus, the social 
cost of carbon does not derive simply from objective facts about the world  -- that is,  
from technological and physical/biological data -- it is the consequence of those physical 
constraints together with a theory of the just way to allocate resources over the 
generations,  which determines the carbon budget of the present generation, and a 
political-ethical resolution of the intra-generational allocation problem (that is, an 
agreement on a)  .  That price, in other words, has as much a political-ethical component 
as a technological-physical one.  Economists mislead the public when they imply that 
there is a correct social cost to carbon emissions, which is independent of ethical 
judgments about inter- and intra-temporal resource allocation. 
 
9. Conclusion    
  Our main conclusions are these:   41 
1.  Solving the problem of the just intertemporal amenity path for a society consisting of 
many generations requires the maximization of a social welfare function
10 provided by a 
theory of justice, subject to constraints provided by facts about the world. 
2.  Two major weaknesses exist in current economic analysis of this problem: first, the 
analyses almost always assume that the correct intergenerational ethic is utilitarianism, 
and second, the modification to discounted utilitarianism is often based on the ethical 
view that the decision problem for a society with many generations is ethically equivalent 
to the decision problem of an infinitely-lived consumer. 
3.  The two main approaches for determining what the discount rate should be are that of 
maximizing the utility of the present generation as a proxy for society ( Approach A) , 
and that of the uncertainty of the existence of future generations (Approach B).  We argue 
that only method B is ethically valid.    Consequently, the discount factor (discount rate) 
that most analyses have adopted is far too small (respectively, large). 
4.  Intergenerational maximin, or sustainability of welfare, is arguably a more attractive 
ethic than utilitarianism.   Maximizing a sustainabilitarian objective will give quite 
different policy recommendations from maximizing a discounted utilitarian one. 
5.  If Approach B is adopted as the justification of discounting, and if the technology is 
sufficiently productive, then the discounted utilitarian program diverges.  In this case, the 
solution of the discounted sustainabilitarian program is exactly the same as the solution 
of the undiscounted sustainabilitarian program.  In other words, the sustainabilitarian 
ethical observer can ignore the kind of uncertainty discussed in approach B. 
6.  A consumptionist fallacy is prevalent in intergenerational welfare analysis, which 
conceptualizes human welfare as a function only of commodity consumption. This limits 
seriously the avenues for maintaining or increasing welfare. 
7.  Based upon parameterization of a model in which the consumptionist fallacy is 
avoided, by recognizing that educated leisure, quality of the biosphere, and knowledge 
are direct goods in producing a Quality of Life, we estimate that to achieve welfare 
sustainability at the highest possible levels, we should be investing at a considerably 
higher rate in capital and knowledge than we currently are.  If our conjectures about high 
                                                 
10 More generally, choosing among paths of infinite utility streams.   42 
productivity are correct, this policy recommendation holds even if we are uncertain about 
the existence of future generations (see point 5). 
8.  If the discounted utilitarian program diverges, and the utilitarian ethical observer 
adopts an overtaking criterion to order amenity paths, she will recommend virtual 
starvation of early generations in order to maximize the long-term rate of growth of 
welfare for later generations – even though very late generations may not exist. 
9.  Regarding the intratemporal problem, we argued that the superficially attractive idea 
of allocating carbon-emission permits to regions to equalize per capita emissions per 
citizen across regions is not, in fact, correct.   The fundamental variable is the target level 
of relative welfare (very simply, of relative consumption) between the regions of the 
world.  Once an ethical theory (or international negotiations) has fixed this parameter, 
then the allocation of carbon-emission permits to the regions will follow, and it will only 
be a singular case in which emission permits per citizen are equalized across regions.   
There is no convincing sense in which the allocation pattern of those permits should be 
viewed as an ethical primitive.     
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Table 1:  An approximate solution to the sustainabilitarian program 
 
Gen 





 ct      ct / ct1
   xt
e
   xt
c
   xt
n
   xt
l
   it    st
k
   st
n
 
2000  1.  1.  23.88  -  0.04653  0.3955  0.0233  0.9307    7.59    73.65  15.64 
1 1.3110 1.3110  40.399  1.6917  0.04660  0.4779  0.0608 1.0643  14.02  199.62  39.72 
2  1.3110  1.  37.931  0.9390  0.05138  0.4444  0.0586  1.0977    8.14  149.26  43.48 
3  1.3111  1.0000  31.759  0.8373  0.05138  0.5129  0.0572  1.2000    8.95  149.26  43.48 
4 1.3111  1  31.759  1  0.0513
8 





e (%)   xt
c (%)   xt
n(%)   xt
l (%)   xt  
2000 0.0333  0.2833  0.0167  0.6667  1.396 
1 0.0282 0.2897  0.0369 0.6452  1.650 
2 0.0311 0.2690  0.0355 0.6645  1.652 
3 0.0282 0.2815  0.0314 0.6588  1.821 
4 0.0282 0.2815  0.0314 0.6588  1.821 
 
      
t = Quality of Life at date t
ct = commodity consumption at date t
xt
e = skilled labor in teaching at date t
xt
c = skilled labor in commodity production at date t
xt
n = skilled labor in commodity production at date t
xt
n = skilled labor in commodity production at date t
xt
n = skilled labor in the research/knowledge industry at date t
xt
l = skill units of leisure at date t
it = investment at date t
st
k = capital stock at date t
st
n = stock of knowledge at date t
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Table 2   An approximate solution to the human-development program with generational 
growth rate of 28% 
 
Gen 
   
t / t0
 
t / t1   ct     ct / ct1   xt
e    xt
c    xt
n   xt
l    it    st
k    st
n  
2000  1.  1.  23.88  -  0.04653  0.3955  0.0233  0.9307    7.59    73.65  15.64 
1  1.2999  1.2999  40.056 1.6774  0.06043 0.4737 0.0603 1.0552  13.89  197.88  39.38 
2  1.6671  1.2824  48.281 1.2054  0.08548 0.5779 0.0796 1.3994  11.53  193.38  55.98 
3  2.1380  1.2824  51.993 1.0769  0.10987 0.8544 0.1004 1.9656  15.81  248.56  71.95 





e (%)   xt
c (%)   xt
n(%)   xt
l (%)   xt  
2000 0.0333  0.2833 0.01667 0.6667 1.396 
1 0.0366 0.2872  0.03654  0.6397  1.649 
2 0.0399 0.2697  0.03715  0.6532  2.142 
3 0.0363 0.2819  0.03313  0.6486  3.030 
4 0.0363 0.2819  0.03313  0.6486  3.895 
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Figure 1   Flows in the model of section 5 